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Realism’s Racial Gaze and Stephen Crane’s 
The Monster: A Lacanian Reading 
 
 
Sheldon George 
 
 
Abstract  
The article presents Stephen Crane’s The Monster as a realist text that conveys the inability of American 
society in the 1890s to define itself through use of stereotyped knowledge of racial others. It reads the 
character Henry Johnson, a black man whose face is “burned away” in a house-fire, leaving behind only a 
single winking eye, as a literary embodiment of the all-seeing Lacanian gaze that, through the returned 
look of the racial other, confronts realist America with its own lack. Henry destabilises fantasies of an 
insular white identity through his performative mimicry of white dress and mannerism. He allows the text 
to present race as grounded only in performance and a discourse of white superiority. The Monster refutes 
this discourse, suggesting it is sanction for a brutal monstrosity at the heart of America, one that the 
returned gaze of the scrutinising racial other now witnesses through the spectacle of America’s racist and 
imperialistic practices. 
 
 
 
Stephen Crane’s novella The Monster begins with a little boy’s game of role playing. Pretending to be 
“engine number 36,” little Jimmie Trescott speedily makes “the run between Syracuse and Rochester” 
(190). In his haste, Jimmie steps on a flower in his father’s, Doctor Trescott’s, garden. In so doing, 
Jimmie symbolically displays to Crane’s reader the fatal, destructive consequences of performing an 
identity that is not one’s own. Though Jimmie tries to stand the trampled flower “on its spine, 
resuscitated, the spine of it [is] hurt, and it…only hang[s] limply from his hand” (190). Jimmie, we are 
told, “could do no reparation” (190). His play acting and Dr. Trescott’s punishment for its ruinous 
effects obliquely introduce us to the anxiety over identity performance that centres the text; turning to 
his son, Trescott warns, “you had better not play train any more” (191). This warning from Trescott is 
in keeping with the time-period’s literary rejection of pretence; what we find in the late 1800s is a 
heightened focus upon social reality that, in the literary realm, marked a renunciation of the maudlin 
emotionality of sentimental texts and a mocking of conspicuous consumption. But as the ending to the 
first scene of a story primarily about a black protagonist named Henry Johnson who mimics white 
dress and mannerism, Trescott’s warning also binds literary rejections of pretence to more immediate 
social anxieties over a growing awareness of the mutability of racial identity. 
 
Crane’s text charts in its Post-Reconstruction literary world a social displacement of dominant racial 
norms established in slavery. It presents a world in which racial identity is a social performance, 
enacted by both black and white characters, and a threat to any renderings of a national identity 
underpinned by notions of a discrete white self. Focused upon Johnson as a black man whose face is 
“simply…burned away” when he tries to save Jimmie in a house fire, the text contemplates the proper 
social position for a seemingly faceless mass of freed blacks in American society, a mass now legally 
cast in the role of American citizens (211). Crane’s text establishes distinctive views for its narrator and 
its varied characters upon this issue of African-American integration into American society. While the 
narrator judges the potential of Henry and his race based upon their imbecilic mimicry of whites, Dr. 
Trescott himself comes to mimic Jimmie’s attempt to resuscitate the injured flower by saving Henry’s 
life and taking on his future care; seeking to make “reparation” to the now physically disfigured and 
mentally debilitated servant who rescued his son and preserved his home, Trescott resists those 
caustic fictions of whiteness that had already scalded generations of African Americans confined 
within the torrid national house that race helped to build (190). Through Trescott and its other 
characters, Crane’s The Monster thus attempts to imagine the possibility of a new start for America, 
contemplating both the potential invalidation of a national identity based upon whiteness and the 
feasibility of coexistence with a population of African-Americans whose identity may now escape the 
stereotyped projections through which American society had come to know them. 
 
Crane writes in the 1890’s, situated within a group of literary artists often called realists or naturalists. 
Scholars like Amy Kaplan have shown that realism was not an artistic endeavour to realistically 
reproduce reality, but a “strategy for imaging and managing the threat of social change” (10). In a 
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rapidly shifting social environment that feels the impact of a recent civil war, a Reconstruction that 
did not properly address issues of social equality, radical technological progress, and an influx of 
racial and ethnic others made manifest through the presence of a now free black population and a 
flood of immigrants from Europe and Asia, realism emerges as “part of a broader cultural effort to fix 
and control a coherent representation of a social reality that seems increasingly inaccessible, 
fragmented, and beyond control” (8). In its specific relation to racial others, realism is a means of 
making the other knowable, of delineating and codifying knowledge about the stranger in one’s 
presence. Crane’s own obsession with observing and recording the lives of New York slum-dwellers is 
well documented in his literature. Of all his texts, however, Crane’s The Monster seems perhaps most 
revealing of the realist sentiment and agenda; as Kaplan explains, “underlying many realist novels” is 
both a “fear” that the social sphere has transformed into “something monstrous and threatening” and 
a challenge embraced by “the novelist” not of “reflecting but of capturing, wrestling, and controlling a 
process of change which seems to defy representation” (10). What we find in The Monster is a Stephen 
Crane who not only actively displays, but is also overwhelmed by, the apparent impossibility of truly 
knowing and representing the racial others who are redefining the American scene. 
 
Crane’s literature presents a view of American society, and indeed of reality itself, that is both an 
extension and a refutation of the realist effort to make the unknowable other known. The Monster’s 
relation to race and realism can be read within the larger context of a propensity within Crane’s works 
to frustrate what Michael Bell calls “the need for authority and certainty” (147). As Bell notes, Crane’s 
texts operate through a literary style that refuses “to authorize any single language or set of images” as 
true to reality (146), a “style that deliberately calls attention to itself as a style” (132). We recognise 
this focus upon literary style when, for example, during Jimmie’s accident with the flower, the text 
describes the doctor as busy “shaving [his] lawn as if it were a priest’s chin” (190). Such use of 
incongruous imagery stresses a focus upon literary style that seems at odds with the realist insistence 
upon what the movement’s pioneer, William Dean Howells, identifies as the need for the artist not to 
“take the life-likeness out” of his texts so as to “put the book-likeness into them” (Criticism 12). But, as 
Bell suggests, Crane’s disruptive and intrusive style of writing advances a “profound skepticism of 
outworn styles of expression” and ways of thinking (139), a skepticism that is in keeping with the 
realist fears expressed by Howells that artistic imitation of the works of “masters” (12) will lead to a 
lack of “fidelity” in the artist’s “expression of life” (11). 
 
Crane’s own fidelity, as Bell shows, is to the “fashioning of an authentic style, an authentic [literary] 
language” (134). Yet, Crane’s language often seems inauthentic, frequently emerging from a mocking 
narrator who, for example, presents the actions of the battling urchins in Maggie within the ill-fitted 
language of a Homeric epic, or who provides a blatantly racist critique in The Monster of the African-
American denizens of Watermelon Alley. What is authentic about this language, however, is its near-
precise articulation of the mindsets of Crane’s characters. As Bell explains, though the urchins have no 
knowledge of Homer, they truly “conceive of their struggle” in such epic terms (138). Their illusions of 
grandeur highlight a focus in Crane upon the “self-delusions of [his] characters” that is equally 
expressed in the narrator’s imitations of Homeric language (138). Through a focus upon imitation of 
linguistic style, Crane’s works convey that when we grant “authority to the styles in which others’ 
perceptions have been expressed” imitation “constitute[s], in effect, the only experience [or access to 
reality] there is” for us (139). If, as Kaplan shows, realism does not reflect, but seeks instead to 
produce anxiety-assuaging knowledge of, reality and racial others, Crane’s work is sympathetic to the 
need for this knowledge and its stabilising social effects (11); but, as Bell argues, Crane remains more 
critical than realists like Howells (139) of a reliance in this produced knowledge upon abstract 
assertions and imitations that are not established “by the authority of personal experience” (141). 
Thus, in The Monster, it is through the narrator’s and other characters’ imitations, and most especially 
through their use of what we may call after Bell “tawdry recyclings” of racist language and thinking, 
that Crane displays his own realist aversion for established styles. Encased within an effort to, as Bell 
says, display the “dreadful power of established styles to determine consciousness,” Crane depicts 
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racist thinking as a form of social imitation anxiously employed in the impossible task of defining the 
other (139). 
 
Crane’s focus upon imitation allows for his unveiling and critiquing of realist efforts to produce the 
racist knowledge and transgressive pleasures that underpin white American identity. My own reading 
of Crane’s relation to realism’s efforts to represent the unknowable is grounded in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Through the aid of Lacanian theorists Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks and Homi Bhabha, I 
will argue that defining the racial other becomes imbricated during the realist period with an effort to 
access the pleasure, or what Jacques Lacan calls the jouissance, of the Real. I read Crane’s text as 
displaying an attempt in both its textual world and American society at large to retain a jouissance of 
the Real that is bound to slavery and race. I suggest that the text recognises that slavery as an 
institution provided white Americans with access to an illicit pleasure which would become blocked 
during the realist moment. In making such an assertion about the relation of American society to 
jouissance, I am beginning from the familiar psychoanalytic reading of the oedipal narrative as a 
reflection of what Freud calls the moral law or the incest taboo. This law, as a prohibition against 
incest, limits the subject’s contact with jouissance. Where the subject’s desire to sleep with the mother 
and kill the father is read in Lacanian terms as a desire to return to the bliss of the Real, to a lost past 
of pleasurable oneness with the mother that only ever existed within and continually shapes the 
fantasies that ground the subject’s psyche, slavery allowed white slave-holding American society a 
transgressive encounter with jouissance. As Seshadri-Crooks asserts, “in the racial realm [of slavery], 
the taboo against incest plays no role” (42); Seshadri-Crooks elaborates that incest was “possible” in 
slavery because the racial symbolic “present[ed] a selected view of the family,” making it so that “the 
master could cohabit with [both] his slaves” and “the children he bred upon his slaves” (42). This 
transgression against the incest taboo, I would argue, is only one synecdochical example of the ways 
that slavery counteracted the normal interdictions that restricted the white subject’s access to 
pleasure. 
 
Scholars like William Brown have noted the striking role that race and pleasure play within both 
Crane’s The Monster and the American society of the time period. Brown traces in realist American 
society an “amusement/knowledge system” (208) grounded upon a “textual transformation 
of…foreigners into freaks” (202). Noting the period’s abiding interest in minstrel shows and its 
fascination with both dime museums and circuses like Barnum and Bailey’s—which displayed both 
freaks and “‘actual’ black savage[s]” (216)—, Brown describes what he calls the “spectatorial 
apparatus” that “produces ‘knowledge’ in convergence with, and as the convergence of, pleasure and 
horror” (210). My own contention is that this accessing of pleasure through knowledge, which for 
Brown is so fully conjoined with horror in the realist period, is marked by a qualitative shift away from 
the pleasure associated with slavery, which had entailed a more direct access to and control over the 
racial other’s body. 
 
Brown approaches a similar view, arguing that Crane’s text figures “a particular shift in American 
visibility that we can begin to sense by remarking how photography…had come to be associated with 
fiends, freaks, and monsters” (236). Partially aided by Lacanian psychoanalysis, Brown contends that 
The Monster “materializes the Lacanian gaze” (236), which is “not the look” of the subject finding 
pleasure in his observation of freaks and savages, but the horrifying sense that the “subject ‘is looked 
at from all sides’” (235). Brown links this new fear of visibility to the development of “the hand 
camera” (237), which had the “disarming effect of arming the public with sight” (236) that threatened 
to violate “private space” and transform everyday Americans into objects of surreptitious observation 
(237). For Brown, “The Monster condenses two histories of American theatricality—the history of the 
minstrel and the history of the freak—to allegorise the process of photographic development as facial 
disfigurement” while also displaying “unprecedented anxieties about the condition of being visible” 
(236). By tying realism more directly to race and pleasure, however, what I would like to develop more 
fully in this paper is Brown’s sense that “literary monsters” can be “understood to demonstrate an 
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externalization of the [Lacanian] gaze” (235), and his reading of the text as exposing “a moment in the 
history of vision when such a psychoanalytic point could become culturally intelligible” (236). 
 
The Gaze and Jouissance 
 
Crane’s text marks this historical shift from the pleasure of seeing to the horror of being seen by 
charting in its literary world the desire for an unchanged post-war American landscape. This desire is 
expressed through the relation of its characters to Henry Johnson. When Henry is burned in the fire 
and carried away on a stretcher, little boys chant a couplet: “Nigger, nigger, never die, / Black face and 
shiny eye” (211). These chants seek to pin Henry as eternal, black-faced other. But, ironically, the fire 
that burns away Henry’s face and turns him into a monster also liberates him from external, white 
categories of identification. Deemed to be horrific beyond words, Henry is described as “simply a 
dreadful thing” (228). What Henry becomes is the Lacanian Thing, where Jacques Lacan defines the 
Thing as an unmasked emergence of the Real (Ethics 71). Lacan asserts that man has eyes so that he 
“might not see” this Real, so that he might not see the lack or nothingness that structures his being 
and consciousness (Fundamental 109). Lacan draws a strict distinction between seeing, as a 
constituent of reality, and what he calls the gaze, as an unveiling of the Real. The act of seeing, Lacan 
shows, involves a process of constructing one’s own “representations” of reality, so that vision itself 
elides the gaze and masks the Real (81). But “if beyond appearance there is nothing,” Lacan says, then 
“there is gaze” (103). The gaze is the subject’s sense that “in [her/his] existence” s/he is “looked at” by 
the Real (72). It is “not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by [the subject to be located] in the field of the 
other” (84), a gaze that “surprises” the subject in her/his voyeuristic process of seeing the reality he 
attempts desperately to construct as a screen over this Real (84). Crane’s text displays, I argue, a 
struggle to see a reality that is grounded in the nullity of whiteness and threatened by the Real Henry’s 
gaze makes manifest. 
 
To understand the function of this gaze, it is important to note its prevalence in Crane’s writing. What 
remains consistent in Crane’s work is an obsession with the returned look of the other who sees the 
subject seeing this other. It appears perhaps most pronouncedly in Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the City, 
where we find the example of two children crouched in a corner staring fearfully at the face of their 
sleeping, inebriated mother: paralysed with immobility, they are convinced that “she need only to 
awake,” only to open her eyes, “and all the fiends would come from below” (13). This emergence from 
below is tied in Maggie to the mother’s ability to exercise a spectral tyranny of control over her 
children that saps them of any joy and binds them to the infernal reality of a life of suffering and abuse 
in the slums. It is this same spectral tyranny that explains Henry’s transformation into monstrosity 
when he loses his face. Henry’s transformation reflects the sense of social chaos that emerges in the 
period as new groups of people, refusing merely to be looked at or externally defined, stake a claim in 
the cultural process of defining American identity. During the late 1800s, with African-Americans in 
particular, we note the intensity of this claim especially in the political arena. As Michael Topp has 
recorded, by the end of Reconstruction in 1877 African Americans had held “six hundred legislative 
seats,” and “fourteen blacks [had] served as U.S. congressional representatives,” with two African 
Americans being “elected as U.S. Senators” and six others serving “as lieutenant governors” (83). 
Where Reconstruction itself was seen by many southerners as a tyrannical imposition, the termination 
of Reconstruction complimented efforts to reverse these advances made by African Americans and 
reassert the power to see and define one’s own world and its occupants. 
 
Given this context, Crane’s story can be said to literalise the phenomenon of the still socially 
unrecognised black man who, during the late 1800s, insists on making himself present, on being seen 
and heard by a community that is repulsed by his physical presence. Henry Johnson is the image of a 
black man simply out of place in the white community that refuses to see him truly. Abhorrently 
faceless, Henry stalks the neighbourhood after his accident, seeking always to mimic white civility. 
Speaking in an inhuman voice and sounding a laugh that is “like the rattle of pebbles” (215), Henry, 
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through his nauseating presence, scares people so that they cannot eat; his casual peering into the 
window of a little girl’s party leaves her “shuddering and weeping” (228); and his stay in Trescott’s 
home leads to the family’s alienation from the rest of the community. Henry is thus a menace to all 
functioning of the communal and domestic spheres. He is a black, faceless other meant neither to be 
heard nor seen. 
 
But the otherness of Henry’s presence does not lie in Henry himself. If Henry is, as the weeping girl 
asserts, “a dreadful thing” (228), what is most Thing-like about Henry is precisely his emergence as 
gaze. Significantly, after the fire, all that remains of Henry’s face is the shiny eyes that peer back 
“unwinking” at the text’s white characters, horrifying them and stopping them in their tracks (212). 
Lacan identifies in the gaze an “anti-life, anti-movement function” (Fundamental 118). It is under “the 
magic of [Henry’s] unwinking eye,” as gaze, that all conversation stops and language falters in the text 
(212). The power of this gaze becomes evident precisely at the level of discourse, as Henry’s 
“unwinking eye” brings to a halt Judge Hagenthorpe’s ability to express to Trescott his belief that “the 
poor fellow ought to die” (213). Preventing Henry’s death, this gaze, in its anti-life function, highlights 
an identifiable threat to what we may call the discursive fantasies that help sustain the psychic life of 
white Americans in the post-slavery era of realism. 
 
To understand this threat, aimed at both discourse and psychic life, we must more fully articulate a 
Lacanian explanation of the relations among the Real, reality, and language. As Lacan argues, “every 
reality is founded and defined by a discourse” of language (Encore 32); but both discourse and the act 
of writing are aimed fundamentally at what escapes symbolisation and can only exist in the Real: 
Language, in its basic metonymic function, attempts to compensate for the constitutive lack of 
subjectivity, for the sexual relation that, Lacan famously announces, cannot be written. Lacan asserts, 
“everything that is written stems from the fact that it will forever be impossible to write, as such, [this] 
sexual relationship,” which escapes symbolisation because it is in the Real (35). Realism, I would say, 
is a linguistic discourse that both attempts and fails to write this relation, continually falling short of 
producing that jouissance which is made inaccessible by the incommensurability of this relation with 
Symbolic representation. 
 
My reading of realism therefore ties realist writing to the elemental effort by language to recapture for 
the subject a sense of jouissance, or bliss, that the subject associates with that part of the self that, in 
Lacan’s words, the “sexed being loses in sexuality” (Fundamental 197). What every subject loses in 
sexuality is some portion of the libido, as “pure life instinct…irrepressible life” (198), the libido as 
what Freud calls polymorphous perverse, able indiscriminately to attain pleasure from all sources. 
Lacan shows that in the course of the sexed being’s development, pleasure becomes localised around 
the erogenous zones, into which the libido “inserts itself” (200). The subject experiences pleasure 
primarily through “one of the orifices of the body,” and thus transforms such objects as the mother’s 
breast (because of its contact with the child’s mouth as orifice) into his/her first form of the objet a, 
the fantasy object that promises the subject an impossible return to a state of bliss and completion. 
“All the forms of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives” of the lost libido, asserts 
Lacan, but they come to be associated with what is found in the Symbolic, with the subject’s mate, for 
example, whom the subject envisions to be a lost half of the self, the lover that will complete him/her 
(198). Lacan affirms that the “sexual relation” is in this way “handed over to the hazards of the field of 
the Other” (199); it is handed over, he explains, to the Symbolic and the discourse of “the old woman,” 
the teachings of those adults through whom, in the Symbolic, one “learn[s] what one must do to make 
love” (199). Thus discourse itself becomes implicated in the subject’s effort to regain her/his lost bliss 
and write the sexual relation. Lacan states, Symbolic “reality is approached with apparatuses of 
jouissance,” and “there’s no other apparatus than language” (Encore 55). 
 
Crane’s focus upon the power of imitated language and styles to determine consciousness 
acknowledges the central role that discourse plays in the mediation of reality. But what Lacanian 
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theory enables us to envision is a reading of realism as a specific moment in American history when 
the presence of racial others forestalls efforts by white writers to employ literature as an apparatus for 
writing the sexual relation and constituting a Symbolic reality that allows for access to some 
semblance of jouissance. Here we encounter a breakdown of the normal Symbolic function of race 
that is so skillfully laid bare by Seshadri-Crooks in her book Desiring Whiteness. Seshadri-Crooks 
shows that in the Symbolic it is “race [that] articulates itself with sex to gain access to desire or lack,” 
access to the lost libido stricken from the subject (3). Where sex, or the libido, escapes the Symbolic 
and, in Lacan’s words, “doesn’t stop not being written” in all of our discourses (Encore 94), Seshadri-
Crooks shows that race attempts to “signify the very thing that is lacking” (43). Race puts itself in the 
“very place of being” (43), or jouissance, presenting “Whiteness” as what Seshadri-Crooks calls “the 
master signifier (without a signified) that establishes [not only] a structure of relations” and a “pattern 
for organizing human difference” (4), but also a system that “attempts to signify the impossible, a core 
notion of humanness, or being itself—the subject beyond symbolic determinacy” (54). Whiteness thus 
functions as the signifier that establishes a fantasy of access to being and jouissance through the 
hierarchal structure of a racial supremacy. 
 
Seshadri-Crooks maintains that given its ability “to fill that place [of lack within the subject] with the 
signifier…the racial symbolic is a success story” (44). The validity of Seshadri-Crooks’ statement is 
borne out by the perpetuation of race into our own time period, but what we most often find in the 
realist moment of American history is the defeat of desperate efforts to shore up those written 
narratives through which white authors utilise race to access a semblance of being. Crane’s work is 
emblematic of a growing realist realisation of the frustrating impossibility of fully binding the other to 
externally imposed meanings. We see this recognition of the limits of imposed definitions approached 
variously in many of the important works of American realism: It emerges, for example, in Mark 
Twain’s depiction of Huck Finn’s growing respect for Jim; in the recognition by Howells’ title 
character Silas Lapham that “the astonishing thing” is “not what a face tells, but what it don’t tell” 
(Rise 79); in the impression of Henry James’s southern protagonist in The Bostonians, Basil Ransom, 
that the age “is womanized” by an inability to “look the world in the face and take it for what it is” 
(260); and in the desire of Christie, from Louisa May Alcott’s Work, to form a “loving league of sisters, 
old and young, black and white,” who can “hasten the coming” of a new age (343). Realism, I thus 
maintain, displays the failure of whiteness as the master signifier of being and jouissance. 
 
As Crane displays this failure, what we see most particularly in The Monster is a realism that depicts 
the circulation of this signifier beyond the ‘racial white’ bodies it is supposed to define. The danger 
that Henry Johnson presents to the social environment of Crane’s text is precisely one of him taking 
on and embodying the signifiers of whiteness that are meant to situate him on the lower rungs of 
society through their production of the hierarchal exclusivity of racial meaning. Crane’s The Monster 
avoids either realistically portraying Henry or fully tying him to stereotypical depictions. Instead, the 
text defines Henry through his performative mimicry of whiteness. Henry is initially presented to us 
as laughable because he parades himself as “the biggest dude in town” (196). When Henry imitates the 
role of a white gentleman-suitor, paying a visit to the beautiful Bella and her mother at their residence 
in Watermelon Alley, the narrator asserts:  they “imitated until a late hour” and “exchanged the most 
tremendous civilities,” but “if they had been the occupants of the most gorgeous salon in the world 
they could not have been more like three monkeys” (197). In spite of the narrator’s mocking of blacks, 
however, there is a certain danger in Henry’s imitative performance. Henry displays a process of 
mimicry that, as Homi Bhabha shows, is often articulated in a racial context around the axis of 
“resemblance and menace” (86).1 Asserting, like Seshadri-Crooks, that desires for the promulgation of 
notions of race are bound to the subject’s psychic need for a sense of totality, Bhabha views racial 
difference as a means of guaranteeing  the white subject’s uniqueness and wholeness; race enables the 
fantasy of what Bhabha calls the “undifferentiated whole white body,” while it simultaneously casts 
inferiority and lack unto the racial other (92). What is challenged in mimicry, therefore, is the fantasy 
of an insular whiteness, a psychic totality that is supported by visible difference. 
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Mimicry transforms into menace by virtue of the fact that it is based upon a resemblance that may, as 
Bhabha says, “radically [revalue] the normative knowledges of race, writing, [and] history” (91). 
Mimicry offers another view of the other, and challenges all forms of authorised knowing of both self 
and other. As Henry saunters down the road in front of the gaping town’s people, it becomes clear that 
it is “not altogether a matter of the lavender trousers, nor yet the straw hat with its bright silk band” 
that makes him notable (194). Though employed in Trescott’s stable tending horses, Henry evidences 
a change that emerges casually with the donning of new clothing. The change, our narrator informs 
us, is “somewhere far in the interior of Henry” (194). There is “no cake-walk hyperbole in it” (194). He 
is “simply a quiet, well-bred gentleman of position” (194). What is depicted here is not precisely 
Henry’s change into a white gentleman, but the textual representation of whiteness and identity itself 
as performance. As Bhabha shows, mimicry “hides no essence, no itself” within the performing subject 
(90). Thus Henry’s chameleon-like changes give proof that popular notions of black identity are linked 
to what we may call after Bhabha a “white man’s artifice inscribed on the black man’s body” (45). 
Henry is dangerous, therefore, because he displays the potential for blacks to break free of their past 
identities and construct a new self in this post-slavery era. 
 
Crane’s text alerts us to this danger through the mobility inherent in Henry’s occupation and through 
characters misreading both Henry’s occupation and his identity. Employed as a hostler, Henry 
exceeds the duties of the stable, trekking into the open space of a town fascinated by his presence. 
Henry’s “extraordinary arrival” (195) in the main street of the town is marked by such physical 
“effulgence” that it is as though “he had never washed a wagon in his life” (194). His “stroll” signals his 
dangerous social mobility as he crisscrosses both his final destination of Watermelon Alley, a 
segregated space assigned to blacks, and the open space of the town (195). His entrance into this open 
space leads to contention and confusion among the town’s residents. The barber shop owner, 
Reifsnyder, “turbulently” asserts, “that man [is] a Pullman-car porter” (196). Reifsnyder’s confusion 
highlights the instability of identity that so destabilises the textual world and historical moment Crane 
describes. Reinforcing a connection between trains, mobility, and performed identities that emerges 
from the very first pages of the text with little Jimmie’s game, Reifsnyder associates Henry with that 
growing population of African Americans who in this period found employment on George Pullman’s 
trains to be a route toward upward mobility. As Jack Santino relates, “the first [Pullman-car] porters 
were drawn from the ranks of slaves, and many porters were born to slave families after slavery itself 
had been abolished” (10); but “everything about Pullman porters is consistent” with an “image of 
urbanity and sophistication” (14). The porters were “the living symbol of the Pullman Company,” 
which offered the public luxury trains that would mark a “golden age of rail travel in the United 
States” (8). To “whites, the porter represented service and luxury,” and “to blacks, he represented 
status and mobility,” a mobility that scholars like Santino and William H. Harris argue would later 
contribute “directly to the creation of a black middle class” in America (Santino 8). 
 
This historical context sheds some light on the town’s people’s impression of Henry as a dandy in 
fancy clothing. Their conception aligns with a process described by Santino whereby, “probably 
because of their real dignity…porters were reduced to fops” in the minds of some Americans, making 
them no longer the “stylish, urbane black man who was threatening to whites because he was not a 
country bumpkin” (121). By viewing the town’s people’s response within this historical context, we 
gain a deeper understanding of the threatening, unstable nature of race in the realist world beyond the 
text. We can further elaborate this understanding through an initial return to the work of Seshadri-
Crooks. Seshadri-Crooks shows that “race is entirely captured and produced by language” (44). This 
discursive root of race is what enables its performance in the manner I have been describing. Realism 
struggles to come to terms with a reality in which such characteristics purportedly inherent to 
whiteness as the refined mannerism of a gentleman can be mimicked by a black buffoon like Henry. 
What we approach here is a moment when white Americans start to experience their subjectivity as 
what Seshadri-Crooks terms “an effect of language” and discourse, confronting them with the “utter 
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groundlessness of the law of racial difference” (45). But as a “success story,” Seshadri-Crooks asserts, 
race recoups itself: “its symbolic origin…does not render it simply historical” because it relies upon 
“the pre-discursive mark[s] on the surface of the body,” such as skin color and hair texture, to 
reproduce racial difference on another level (46). What we find in both Crane and realism more 
generally, however, is the fallibility of these racial markers. 
 
When he first sees Henry walk past his barber shop, Reifsnyder, whose name and accent mark his 
immigrant status, asserts to his customers, “I bait you any money that vas not Henry Johnson” (196). 
Reifsnyder’s status as owner of an established business within the community, despite his apparent 
Germanic background, suggests that skin colour is the differential factor that determines acceptance 
into the white community. But his ability to identify with Henry’s status, his questioning of “how it 
feels to be without any face,” also implies his awareness of his own liminal position in the community 
(223). As one of his customers notes to him, “you’re kicking because if losing faces became popular, 
you’d have to go out of business” (223). The customer’s comment most directly references the fact that 
Reifsnyder makes his living grooming the heads and faces of others in the community, thus indicating 
the dependence of their identity upon his deferential presence; but more importantly, it also speaks to 
his proximity to the kind of social invisibility and voicelessness the text contemplates in relation to 
blacks. As the narrator divulges, because he had not been “taught silence by the hammering 
reiteration of a tradition,” Reifsnyder “was very garrulous” (221). Reifsnyder’s insistence upon 
speaking when he is not supposed to causes him to become an annoyance to his customers. They call 
him a “chump” and tell him to “shut up” (221). Through these customers’ distance from Reifsnyder 
and through Reifsnyder’s relation to Henry’s facelessness, we see that skin colour is no assurance that 
one is welcomed in American realist society. 
 
What we note in realism is the way that, far from being predictably established through skin color, 
otherness is continually defined and redefined2  We see this clearly when we expand our purview of 
realism beyond Crane. Writing in the same time period as Crane and sharing Crane’s interest in 
tenement life, Jacob Riis, for example, refutes the argument “that pauperism and drunkenness 
naturally grow in the tenements” of New York (25) by presenting in a positive light both the “order-
loving German” (41) and his African American “fellow-citizens” (119). Often defining difference 
through recourse to either language or religious belief, Riis contrasts “the German, who begins 
learning English the day he lands as a matter of duty,” to the Italian, who “learns slowly, if at all” (42), 
and to the “Joss worshippers,” “John Chinaman,” who has resisted “all attempts to make an effective 
Christian” of him “in this generation” (73). Since it is not primarily race that here excludes “John 
Chinaman,” the Chinese stand on equal footing, not with blacks for Riis, but with the Jews of 
“Jewtown,” New York, who have “crowded out the Gentiles” (82). Just as the Chinese’s true god is “the 
‘Melican Joss,’ the almighty dollar” (79), “money is [the Jew’s] God” (83), and Jews remain where “the 
new day that dawned on Calvary left them standing, stubbornly refusing to see the light” (87). For 
Riis, it is the Jews, Italians, and Chinese who lack social mobility, while, like Germans, the African 
American has emerged as the new “colored citizen” who is, Riis contends, “a very different individual 
from the ‘nigger’” of the past (114). “Cleanliness is the characteristic of the negro,” says Riis (114); but 
unlike the laundry-worker “Chinaman,” whose “cat-like” cleanliness is linked to “stealth and 
secretiveness” (75), the African American displays a cleanliness that shows him to be “immensely the 
superior of the lowest of the whites, the Italians and the Polish Jews, below whom he has been classed 
in the past” (114). 
 
This inconsistency in realist assertions about where racial and ethnic groups are to be situated within 
the social sphere is reflective of an oscillation in the fantasies through which racial difference attempts 
to grant access to being and jouissance in the realist period. The work of Lacanian scholar Slavoj Zizek 
can lend some perspective to both this oscillation and Crane’s text. Zizek’s reading of racism allows us 
to see that this oscillation is not tied to the particular racial or ethnic group the realist struggles to 
position, but rather to that group’s capacity to fulfill a fantasy function; he asserts, “one falls into the 
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ideological trap [of racism] precisely by succumbing to the illusion that anti-Semitism really is about 
Jews” (77). Since “the gap that separates reality from the Real” is the “screen of fantasy” (66), the 
subject only ever encounters the racial other as a source of jouissance “in so far as this other enters the 
subject’s fantasy-frame” (64). If realism is marked by this intense confusion over identity, we can say 
in Zizek’s words that, “in this violent upheaval,” what “caused the shift was merely the change in the 
other’s position with regard to [the subject’s] phantasmic frame” (65). In a time period when Jews, 
Italians, Irish, and other groups look ‘white’ in skin color but retain cultural, religious, linguistic, and 
national identities that make them less appealing than—or even the social inferiors of—African 
Americans, whiteness as the organising signifier of difference becomes unreliable; indeed, the fantasy 
frame established by whiteness, by that superlative which promises a plenitude of being and 
jouissance, becomes threatened with its own partial or temporary disintegration. “When the 
phantasmic frame disintegrates,” Zizek says, “the subject undergoes a ‘loss of reality’ and starts to 
perceive reality as an ‘irreal’ nightmarish universe” (66). This “irreal” reality is precisely what realism 
charts. 
 
Fictions of Race and the Fragmented Self 
 
In realism, there is a growing awareness of race as, not a biological fact of reality, but what Mark 
Twain calls in Pudd’nhead Wilson a “fiction of law and custom” (9). The reversal we see in the social 
positions held by blacks in Crane’s and Riis’s texts is determined precisely by these authors’ differing 
relation to the dual components of this fiction: the law and custom. Riis can embrace African 
Americans because the law has defined them as citizens. Despite the American custom of racism, their 
social position is legally established for Riis, and their historical past becomes what makes them 
knowable as, in Riis’ words, “easily moulded,” “loyal to the backbone,” and “proud of being an 
American” (118). What we find in Crane, however, is a sense that the lingering customs of racism 
continue to surface in American society as direct violations of the laws of the nation. 
Most particularly, Crane’s The Monster presents a veiled critique of the continued outlaw practice in 
American society of lynching black men. The text presents this practice as dangerous to the nation and 
its founding principles. While describing Henry’s attempt to rescue Jimmie from the fire, the text 
informs us that the flame that “block[s Henry’s] path and [threatens to doom] him and Jimmie” (205) 
is an “outbreak [that] had been well planned, as if by professional revolutionist” (202). In an apparent 
reference to the Ku Klux Klan, the text relates that “no one could hear this low droning of the 
gathering clans,” but the rising conflagration finds “the cord that support[s] ‘Signing the Declaration 
[of Independence],’” causing it to drop “to the floor, where it burst with the sound of a bomb” (202). 
Rejecting the notion of black inferiority inherent in Klan-like thinking, and embracing that notion of 
identity as performed which so unsettles both the text’s characters and its narrator, the scene depicts a 
fire that consumes and turns to ashes not just principles that define American and white identity, but 
also stereotypes that define a black otherness. In this decisive moment, when white men respond to 
the fire with a “temporary insanity,” Henry acts heroically and impulsively to save Jimmie (203). 
Henry’s act breaks him free of the racial identity roles he is supposed to perform for the spectators 
whom he fascinates. Significantly, when Henry does find himself temporarily submitting to the 
flames, it is only “because of his fathers,” because of his conscious association with a historical past 
and the discourse that surrounds it, a stereotypical discourse about racial identity that urges him to 
“[bend] his mind in a most perfect slavery to the conflagration” (204). 
Crane’s text challenges this discourse. As Elaine Marshall argues, it is quite likely that The Monster is 
Crane’s response to “his brother William’s eye-witness account of the lynching of Robert Lewis” (206). 
The lynching took place in Crane’s hometown of Port Jarvis, New Jersey, and Crane speaks of his text 
as an effort to “scold away” at the town’s populace for allowing such an atrocity (205). It is the 
lingering presence of these racial atrocities, which here spread across space and time into the north,  
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that would lead Mark Twain to describe America as “The United States of Lyncherdom” (Great Works 
479). Both Twain and Crane are unsettled by the sense that America has, as Twain puts it, “fallen” 
(479). Consequently, what we see in Crane’s focus on Henry is not an investigation of black racial 
identity, but an analysis of the white psyche that constructs the figure of the racialised black man. If 
The Monster is focused upon the Lacanian gaze, we must recall that confronting this gaze means 
confronting one’s own lack mirrored through the eyes of the other. This mirroring is what is conveyed 
in the text’s assertion that Henry’s face “showed like a reflector” (197). Henry reflects back an image 
“alienated” from the white self, a “dark reflection” cast onto Henry as other (Bhabha 44). What is 
manifested in Henry is not a radical split between “self and [racial] other,” but instead what Bhabha 
terms “the otherness of the self,” the brutal inner core of the white self that has been displaced unto 
the racial other (44). 
What was at stake in realism was primarily a definition of whiteness itself, and Crane is appalled by 
the brutality he identifies with this identity. Crane presents his textual world as one dominated by a 
spectacle of horror that is the very support of his characters’ white, American identity. We see this 
clearly in the aftermath of the fire, as “each man in the stretcher party” carrying the charred body of 
Henry Johnson receives from it “a reflected majesty” (210). But it is Martha Goodwin—the one person 
willing to “defy the universe” (233) and “go against the whole town” in its condemnation of Henry 
Johnson (242)—who best exemplifies in the world of the text how this majesty grows out of a 
conjoined brutality and blind apathy toward others. Martha’s majesty is displayed in the strength of 
her personality, her willingness to “try not to be afraid” of Henry (243) and not to join the “crowd 
around the jail” that forms what looks like a lynch mob after Henry starts a riot by scaring “an Irish 
girl” on the streets (233). Through this strength, however, Martha holds a “mental tyranny” over 
others (242), ensuring that when a “situation was without definitions,” Martha “made definitions” 
(232). Significantly, Martha’s definitions are all tied to revenge. Having suffered the early death of 
“her betrothed” (231), Martha conflates her readings and definitions of “the situation in Armenia, the 
condition of women in China, …the duty of the United States towards the Cuban insurgents, and many 
other colossal matters” with the “face of a man” she has lost because of a disease he “had not caught 
from her” (231). Wounded by this betrayal, Martha is “simply the mausoleum of a dead passion,” 
which makes of her “the most savage critic in town” (233). Majestic and vengeful, Martha is a “woman 
of peace” who argues “constantly for a creed of illimitable ferocity” (232): in “the plan she had made 
for the reform of the world,” she “advocated drastic measures,” asserting such contentions as “all the 
Turks should be pushed into the sea” (232). 
Martha embodies the horrific process by which Americans express their own psychological turmoil 
through a violence upon others that is masked as empathy. Having lost access to all but the gossamer 
image of the “face of [the] man” whose presence grounded both her domestic and her psychic 
fantasies of completion (231), Martha is plagued by what we may call after Lacan an aggressivity 
expressed through obsession with violence and images of “the fragmented body” (Ecrits 11). 
Aggressivity, Lacan tells us, arises from the breakdown of the subject’s totalising fantasies and 
involves feelings of frustration that are exhibited through thoughts and actions that “den[y] respect 
for the natural forms of the human body” (11). Thus we may view both Martha’s ferocity and the 
radical spread after slavery of such violent practices as lynching3  as expressions of aggressivity, as acts 
of what Lacan terms “narcissistic tyranny” (27) aimed at the “[derealisation] of [racial] others” who 
challenge one’s totalising views of the self and its world (28). Incapable of escaping her own 
narcissism, Martha, in the end, is driven only by her own pain and her trivial desire to gossip about 
the mishaps in her neighbours’ lives: abandoning her efforts to speak up in Henry’s defence, Martha 
joins her friends in taking up the new obsession of finding out exactly where the “Hannigans [who 
have been scared off by Henry] are going to move to” (243). 
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Martha’s passions are unveiled by the text in a manner that is telling of a larger realist fear. Not only 
do we find in realism a sense of dread at seeing what lies at the heart of Americans, but we also 
recognise a very prominent apprehension that the tarnished soul of Americans is laid bare especially 
for racial others to observe. This apprehension is perhaps most noticeable in Twain. Responding to 
the imperialistic exploits of the United States that so fascinate Martha, Twain argues in his essay “To 
the Person Sitting in Darkness” that “we have debauched America’s honour and blackened her face 
before the world” (Great Works 215). Twain remarks that imperialistic America has “been so eager to 
get every stake that appear[s] on the green cloth, that the People who Sit in Darkness have noticed it—
they have noticed it, and have begun to show alarm” (206). Not only have they “become suspicious of 
the Blessings of Civilization,” but “more—they have begun to examine them” (206). Twain’s sense is 
precisely that the other sitting in darkness now returns the gaze of and has become the gaze for 
Americans caught up in the jouissance of their own brutality. 
This gaze fundamentally disrupts the discourses that underwrite whiteness and justify its racial and 
social dominance in realist America. As Price McMurray shows, if the central dilemma that confronts 
Dr. Trescott after Henry’s accident is a question of whether or not it is morally responsible of Trescott 
to allow Henry to live, this is because The Monster unmasks and critiques a social Darwinism that was 
foundational to a contemporaneous “system of belief in which black regression and eventual 
extinction were givens” (55). Trescott weighs the fact of Henry saving his son’s life against racist 
claims that “any attempt to resist the Darwinian certainty of black extinction [is] unintentional 
cruelty” (54). I contend that this newly popular form of Darwinian racism should be seen in the 
context of Lacan’s assertion that Darwin’s theories “sanctioned” for “Victorian society” the “social 
devastation that it initiated on a planetary scale,” providing this society justification for its brutality 
through the “laissez-faire of the strongest predators in competition for their natural prey” (Écrits 26). 
What happens in such a society in which the strong freely dominate the weak is that the empowered 
subject’s relation to the “particular spatial field” of his/her fragmented psyche and body becomes 
“mapped socially” in such a way that both the subject’s fantasies and his/her aggressivity are freely 
articulated onto the serviceable body of the other (27). 
This kind of society attempts to establish itself in realist America as a continuation of those traditions 
and customs of slavery that allowed access to jouissance through the immanent availability of the 
slave. But if the subject of race seeks ultimately to ground his/her jouissance in a totalising racial 
fantasy of being, it is only the other’s precarious positioning within this subject’s fantasy frame that 
can quiet the subject’s nightmares of fragmentation and fashion his/her dreams of a self devoid of 
lack. This subjective reliance upon the other is the central truth that Lacan articulates in his famous 
theory of the mirror stage, where the child can prop his/her fantasy of coherence only upon the 
presence of the reflected mother in the mirror: Subjectivity demands such external supports. In this 
period when blacks and growing numbers of immigrant populations begin to assert their own visibility 
and vocalise their own self definitions, realism confronts a social fragmentation that hinders the 
organisation of an American identity around ready-made supportive fantasies and discourses of the 
hierarchal relations between the self and the racial other. Where once, as masters of their social 
sphere, white Americans were able to throw “back unto the world the disorder of which [their] being is 
composed,” now significantly deprived of control over the psychic projections and sustaining fantasies 
that make both the self and the other knowable, realist America moves toward a confrontation with 
the horrific monstrosity of its own lack (Lacan, Écrits 20). Stephen Crane’s The Monster, through its 
punctiform reduction of the alienated self into a rendering of the faceless racial-other’s returned gaze, 
draws our sights to a portentous adumbration of this lack. In the process, what Crane allows us to 
glimpse is not the incinerated visage of a black man, but the terrifying vacuity of the desolate 
whiteness that seems to be slowly unmasking itself at the heart of realist American society. 
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Notes 
1 Though Bhabha’s work emerges from Lacan’s writings on the gaze and mimicry, I turn here to Bhabha instead of 
Lacan because Bhabha’s theory involves a more direct investigation of the social implications of psychic activity. 
While Lacan, for example, ties the gaze to the evil eye and an “envy that makes the subject pale before the image 
of a completeness [in the other] closed upon itself,” Lacan does not provide analyses of the relation of such need 
for completeness to social phenomenon like racism (Fundamental 116). 
 
2 Indeed, as David Roediger notes, though the “first Congress convened under [the] Constitution voted in 1790 to 
require that a person be ‘white’ in order to be a naturalized citizen of the U.S.,” the “hopeless imprecision of the 
term [white] left courts with impossible problems of interpretation that stretched into the twentieth century” 
(181). 
 
3 Mae M. Ngai relates that in the 1890s, when Crane writes The Monster, “at least two to three black southerners 
were hanged, burned at the stake, or otherwise murdered each week” (103). 
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